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complicated by the apparent lack of interest that was displayed by both the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national
command authorities in focusing upon
the Kosovo situation.
The third part of the book, “The Air
Campaign,” addresses the execution
phase of ALLIED FORCE. Here Clark’s
shortfalls in planning and his inability to
forge a supportive relationship with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of
defense become apparent. Two days into
the operation, Clark wrestled with the
implications of having no defined
end-state and the resulting fuzzy linkage
between military and political objectives.
Incredibly, he attempts to deflect criticism toward the political leadership for
the fundamental flaws in the plan. The
effects of this confused strategy vacuum
lingered throughout the operation. In addition to the strategy challenges faced by
Clark, the Washington leadership was
not supportive—indeed, Clark depicts it
as an impediment. His assessments of
then Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hugh Shelton, and Army Chief
of Staff General Dennis Reimer are
damning. Clark is unambiguous that
from his perspective, all three men contributed to a lack of national strategic coherence during the operation. This
section ends by depicting a slippery slope
toward an inevitable ground invasion of
Kosovo—something that everyone
wanted to avoid.
The final section of the book, “Endgame,” details the sudden change in circumstances and Milosevic’s willingness
to accept a deal. Clark outlines the
time-sensitive and painstaking negotiations required to ensure an executable
plan for the Nato peacekeeping force. He
also addresses the now famous refusal of
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his subordinate, Lieutenant General Sir
Michael Jackson of the British army, to
send forces into Pristina airfield to block
the impending arrival of Russian forces.
Clark concludes with an examination of
his experience and its implications for future warfare.
This is a worthwhile book for those interested in the Kosovo conflict and how the
Nato alliance works in practice. Subsequent memoirs from other key participants will add balance to this historical
perspective. As for contributing to the
body of knowledge on military theory, as
the title implies, one must be less enthusiastic. Instead of presenting new theoretical constructs applicable to modern
war, in reality the book displays the pitfalls faced by a joint-force commander
and his national-level superiors when
they disregard the fundamental tenets of
operational art.
PATRICK C. SWEENEY

Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001. 130pp.

Barry Watts, former director of the
Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and
now the director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Program Analysis and Evaluation, has written an
assessment of military competition in
near-earth space and how that competition may evolve over the next twenty-five
years. Aside from the importance of its
subject, this book is of particular interest
because it explicitly attempts a “net assessment.” Watts worked for Andrew
Marshall, director of the OSD Office of
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Net Assessment (ONA) from its establishment in 1973. Marshall played a major role in, among other things, the
conceptualization of the “revolution in
military affairs” (RMA) and is currently
playing a major role in the Bush administration’s defense review. Much of the
work of ONA is highly classified, and it
has been difficult to understand just what
is involved in “net assessment.” Now we
have an example. How does it look?
Watts observes that the United States is
the preeminent user of space today and
that the way it uses space has changed
from the preconflict reconnaissance and
warning of before, say, 1991 to enhancement of operations by traditional sea, air,
and land forces since then. Watts argues
that the U.S. primacy is unlikely to
change, because the cost of moving mass
into orbit is likely to remain high, and
because much of the U.S. advantage originates in its organization and the tacit
knowledge of its operators rather than
the assets themselves. A key asymmetry
between the United States and its potential adversaries is that America is inherently more dependent on spacebased assets. Rather than repeat the U.S.
effort, adversaries without the same budgetary and organizational constraints
may be able to exploit commercial and
dual-use technologies to meet their needs
adequately and may attempt to reduce
U.S. capabilities by attacking terrestrial
downlinks rather than space-based assets.
Thus Watts does not think it likely that
overt military competition or conflict in
space will happen over the next
twenty-five years, to the extent that
weaponization of space occurs, but he
does believe it is inevitable over the long
run, if more gradual than abrupt. That
said, Watts does not expect that the military use of space for communications
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and intelligence in 2025 will be essentially different from its use today.
Watts’s assessment, although nuanced, is
sometimes confusing. One of the most
puzzling issues is whether space is considered to be a military or economic center of gravity. Watts says that the survival
of the United States does not depend on
space-based assets. Yet he repeatedly observes that U.S. forces are increasingly
dependent on satellites for communications and intelligence. What would happen if U.S. satellites were attacked? He
discusses this only in terms of attacks on
satellites in low earth orbits (LEO).
Watts’s judgment that nonnuclear
antisatellite (ASAT) attacks on individual
satellites would be taken seriously by the
U.S. leadership but might not lead to war
seems plausible. In contrast, his argument that nuclear attacks on satellites in
LEO would not have much military effect
yet would be met with so strong a response that even pariahs would be deterred seems summary. Why would there
be a strong response if space is not a center of gravity? Also, what happens if deterrence fails? As Marshall has said, “It is
not a matter of deterring someone like
us, but someone like him.”
The significance of the issue may be visible
in a situation Watts does not consider—the
effects of large-scale nonnuclear attacks
on satellites in higher orbits. Given the
interest in RMAs at Net Assessment, it is
curious that he does not consider what
might be a true RMA for the U.S. military, albeit one in reverse—a large-scale
degradation of U.S. communications, reconnaissance, and Global Positioning
System satellites. For example, while the
cost of moving mass into geostationary
transfer orbit may be expensive (according to Watts, moving 2,200 pounds to
geostationary transfer orbit using a

2

Davis and Watts: The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment
170

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Chinese Long March 2C costs twenty-five
million dollars), middle tens to low hundreds of millions of dollars for an antisatellite program may be an attractive
price for a capability to attack the small
number of high-value U.S. communications
satellites in high orbits. A direct-ascent
ASAT program might cost less.
Indeed, a country contemplating war
with the United States might consider a
billion dollars or so to degrade U.S. capability substantially by attacking
thirty-five or forty American satellites
money well spent. Hard, yes; guaranteed
successful, no; but the severity of the outcome might be merely a function of
money for an adversary and a serious
problem for the United States if satellites
move from being force multipliers to
force divisors. In an explicit net assessment the issue of U.S. vulnerability and
the capability of potential adversaries
should be addressed more thoroughly before the wisdom of raining titanium rods
from space is considered.
This book is recommended as an introduction to an important and insufficiently
understood topic. It is also recommended
as an example of net assessment, though,
perhaps as intended, it is better at asking
significant and useful questions and sensitizing readers to problems than at providing answers.
CARMEL DAVIS

University of Pennsylvania

Alexander, John B. Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons
in Twenty-first Century Warfare. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999. 255pp. $14.95

The purpose of this book is to draw attention to the use of nonlethal weaponry
in future warfare scenarios. The subject is
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divided into three major sections that, respectively, discuss the rationale behind
the use of nonlethal weaponry, provide
an introduction to new technologies, and
suggest scenarios of tactical and strategic
uses. Throughout the book, Alexander
focuses the reader’s attention on some of
the more critical issues of the appropriate
use of nonlethal weaponry in the U.S. arsenal and, in so doing, demonstrates that
new weaponry is needed to respond adequately to new and emerging types of
conflict.
One of Alexander’s fundamental assumptions is that “war has always represented
the controlled application of force” and
that nonlethal weaponry can be part of
that controlled application of force consistent with military objectives. The questions are: How will new technologies be
used to control the level, type, and effects
of the force? How do these new technologies relate to changing military and political objectives? How can nonlethal
weaponry best be applied when the objective is to limit force application in a
variety of situations? These are not easy
questions by any stretch of the imagination, but Alexander has had the temerity
to put them forward for public scrutiny.
Alexander is no dilettante; his expertise
in this area is recognized by the number
of well-known serving military officers
who have written short scenario-vignettes
printed in the front of the book. Neither
should it go unnoticed that Tom Clancy
wrote the foreword and General John J.
Sheehan wrote the introduction. Notably, Alexander chaired one of the first
major conferences on nonlethal weaponry and participated in the landmark
study by the Council on Foreign Relations on nonlethal weapons. He has experience as a military commander with
the Green Berets in Vietnam, as Dade
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